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Rehnquist: Legal Education: A Consumer's Point of View

TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 10, Number 1

Dedication Issue

LEGAL EDUCATION: A CONSUMER'S POINT
OF VIEW

William H. Rehnquist,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court
This article was originally delivered as the dedicatory address on the occasion of the dedication of John Rogers Hall,
the new College of Law facility at the University of Tulsa,
January23, 1974.
It is both a pleasure and an honor to be invited to speak to you
on this auspicious occasion. My previous contacts with your fine city,
its University, Law School, and bar have been minimal. The first time
I ever saw Tulsa was in the early morning of a day in March, 1944,
when I was traveling under army orders to Will Rogers Field in Oklahoma City. Having grown up in Wisconsin, I had never been as far
west as Tulsa before, and I was awakened from a fitful doze on one
of the Frisco Lines passenger cars by the conductor shouting, "Tulsy!
Tulsy! Change for Muskogee, Okmulgee, Chickasha," and other
points whose names now escape me. I felt I had really arrived in the
Wild West.
It is merely stating the obvious to say that your city bears no recognition today to the fitful glimpse of it which I caught thirty years
ago. This morning we dedicate John Rogers Hall, the splendid building in which the University's College of Law begins its second half
century. When one contemplates the changes that the world has undergone in the first half century of the existence of the College of
Law, the task of predicting the developments of the next half century
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should make even the most audacious of prophets pause. Who would
have thought fifty years ago that the city of Tulsa would be a center
of maritime activity, and the University's College of Law called upon
to turn out proctors in admiralty as well as landlubber lawyers? Today
the College of Law stands, with the student body five hundred strong,
on the threshold of what seems bound to be a second half century equally
as challenging as its first.
It seems appropriate that on this occasion the dedication address
should deal with legal education. Since I have not the shadowiest of
credentials as a legal educator, this felt necessity of the occasion might
at first blush seem to pose a problem. But even though I may not
qualify as one who knows how to produce lawyers, I can qualify in
two other respects as a judge of the product. As a one-time practitioner in a small law firm concentrating on civil litigation, and as a
judge who every year hires three law clerks and who hears approximately three hundred lawyers orally argue cases each year, I feel that
my standing as a consumer is indisputable. In addition, more than
twenty-odd years ago, I too was in law school, and was a part of the
raw material that was being processed into the finished product which
law schools put out. In this day of the class action, perhaps I may
broaden my comments to reflect the interests of other consumers of
legal services, which in this day and age would certainly be a staggeringly large class.
One occasionally gets the feeling today, in talking to law students
or very recent law graduates, that they consider law school to be primarily a three-year period of incubation. It is in their eyes a requirement imposed by those already in the practice to make sure that they
are not inundated with competitors; it is a way station where the aspiring lawyer must spend a certain amount of time before he is licensed
to display the talents which he has presumably had from birth. Such
brash self-confidence, when properly polished and honed by education
and practice, can be an invaluable attribute for a lawyer. But no law
school worthy of its salt should let its graduates emerge unshaken in
their skeptical belief that they could have gotten along pretty well
without it.
Law school, particularly first year law school, is for many, and
ought to be for all, a period of genuine intellectual awakening. Why
is this? Legal education is surely not the only branch of scholarship
which deals in great questions, challenging ideas, or thought-provoking
hypotheses. As one who had concentrated in the field of political
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philosophy before going to law school, I was no stranger to "great issues" debates and arguments lasting long into the night when I began
my legal education. But the great difference which I found between
the sort of discussions which I had come from, and those which I
entered upon in law school, was the role of facts and the analysis of
facts.
A legal maxim current in my student days, and perhaps still current, is that a lawyer "doesn't have to know the law, he only has to
know where to find it". I suspect the kernel of truth in this maxim
stems from its recognition that perhaps the major acquisition of a law
student from his three years in law school is the sharpening of his analytical abilities, rather than the compiling of large amounts of knowledge about the various substantive areas of the law. And, taken in
this limited context, there is undoubtedly an element of truth in the
maxim; legal education, I would suppose, unlike some other branches
of graduate education, is not primarily devoted to the storing up of
knowledge, but instead to the sharpening of the methods by which we
analyze knowledge.
Just as other graduate disciplines pose the same sort of significant
policy choices as does legal education, so, too, other graduate disciplines demand the same and perhaps greater rigor of analysis from
their students. It would surely be a bold lawyer who was prepared
to insist that the sheer mental effort required of him was greater than
that of a graduate student in advanced mathematics or physics. I think
that the unique aspect of legal education is that it has traditionally integrated into a single discipline the thought provoking policy questions
which inhere in any study of how man is to be governed with the same
demand for rigorous analysis which is found in the world of the
sciences.
The method by which this synthesis has been traditionally obtained is the study of cases. The cases, as law students eventually
find out, are not ends in themselves, but only means of showing the
endless factual variations with which judges and lawyers are confronted. The difficult aspect of legal education for the student is coming to understand why the holding of the case he has just read is inapplicable to the case immediately following it in the textbook. He
must learn to see that as the facts are dissimilar, the conflicting social
policies which the law embodies come out differently balanced in one
case than in another. This is why a good memory is no guarantee
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of success in law school; recalling the governing rules is not the end,
but the beginning, of the solution of a legal problem.
One of the great paradoxes of the art of government is that one
can put two candidates for public office or, for that matter, two lawyers, in opposite rostrums, and listen to them discuss general principles, and come away with the view that they are 180 degrees apart
in their view of the subject discussed. But put the same two candidates, or two lawyers, at a table with a specific factual problem to
solve, and their proposed solutions, while doubtless not identical, will
be sufficiently close so as to totally belie the notion of foursquare opposition to one another. This is the great virtue of facts, because facts.
force the mind to focus on a precise situation.
A somewhat flip description of the purpose of legal education
current in my day was that it was supposed to teach one to "make
a noise like a lawyer". Doubtless the analytical skills which should
be imparted by legal education are bred in part by the encouragement
of dispute, argument, and contention in the classroom, in moot court
competitions, in after-class discussions, and in the real courtroom itself
during clinical phases of legal education. But it would be the grossest
error to suppose that a few facile off-the-cuff arguments on behalf of
one's client, or a few generalized and superficial enunciations of
"policy considerations" in support of one's argument, were in any sense
the equivalent of a truly lawyer-like presentation of a case.
In this respect I cannot possibly improve on the comments made
by Erwin Griswold, for many years Dean of the Harvard Law School
and later Solicitor General of the United States, about his hopes for
Harvard Law School; whether or not he would agree that these
thoughts might be made generally applicable to all law schools, I think
they can. In a talk which he made in 1970, he expressed his hopes
-that:
The school will never yield in maintaining the highest intellectual standards, including rigor and intellectual honesty,
and the recognition that thought in our field does not come
easily and superficially. ...
He went on to extol the "scorn for shoddy and wishful thinking, and
an understanding of the power of the mind when applied with rigor
and discipline" which was obtainable in law school.
I felt when I was in law school, and have continued to feel in
the more than twenty years since I graduated from it, that one of the
great virtues of 'the Socratic method of teaching law is that it enables the
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student to almost unconsciously realize how differing policies of the
law conflict with one another. As facts are added or subtracted in
a particular hypothesis, the mind of the student sees the argument in
favor of one policy strengthened, the argument in favor of another policy weakened. When discussion of important social or political issues
takes place in an atmosphere of generalization or abstraction, participants are free to choose their own first premises and generally leave
by the same door whence they entered. But if the question as to what
rule rightly ought to govern conduct is focused on a particular factual
situation, the discussion is necessarily sharpened, and the bases for
reaching a particular conclusion necessarily brought into clearer focus.
The emphasis in legal education on improving analytical skills is
noted in a recent motion picture, Paper Chase. It tells the story of
the interplay between a crusty law professor of the old school and an
emancipated law school student of this generation. The professor's
name is Kingsfield, and I am not in a position to know whether the
University of Tulsa College of Law has any counterpart of his on the
faculty or not. But if we put to one side Professor Kingsfield's sadistic
streak, there is a good deal of truth to his comment to the assembled
students that "we perform brain surgery in law school". It is symbolic
surgery, only, of course, and it is done not in the operating room but
in the classroom. But the graduating law student should leave with
a significantly more developed set of analytical skills than those with
which he entered. This, to me, is one of the great things which a
law school can and should impart to its students, and law schools
should have no hesitation in saying that such skills do not come easily,
and that they are absolutely essential for the practice of law.
I think there may be a tendency on the part of some students,
and indeed on the part of some practitioners, to rely too much on the
maxim which I earlier mentioned, that a lawyer doesn't have to know
the law, he only has to know where to find it. The first flaw in the
maxim will be apparent to anyone who has practiced the profession.
The trial lawyer sitting at counsel table during the trial, suddenly confronted with his opponent's offer of a damaging exhibit in evidence,
had better know the law of evidence right then. Discovering several
days later a case which might have been the basis for a successful objection is little consolation to the lawyer, and none at all to the client.
Nor is the necessity that a lawyer at least know some law confined
to a litigation practice. If the manufacturer calls his attorney telling
him that a truckload of parts which appear not to conform to specifica-
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tions is at his delivery dock, and asks if he should accept delivery or
not, he does not want an answer next week; he wants it in the course
of that telephone conversation. Even a very experienced lawyer cannot on such short notice give as sound an answer as he could after several hours' research, but he is going to have to give it nonetheless, and
to do it he had better have at least a nodding acquaintance with the
law governing sales, negotiable instruments, and credit transactions.
But the more serious flaw in the notion that a lawyer need only
know where to find the law is the negative implication which some
seem inclined to build on its rather narrow foundation. Their hypothesis would presumably run this way: We have come to law school to
learn the law; we now find out that we don't need to know the law,
but only where to find it; therefore, a good course in legal bibliography
and research is about the only useful thing that we can take away from
law school. If this were the case, of course, it would be an outrageous
reflection on the law schools of this country to detain their students
for three years. But of course it is not the case.
The proper implications to be drawn from the idea that a lawyer
need not have an encyclopedic knowledge of the law is that the development of the lawyer's skills and judgment require a good deal
more than simply storing up of knowledge of legal doctrine. The
development of the analytical skills which are the primary intellectual
tools of the lawyer does not result simply from walking in and out of
classrooms in law school, but from intensive examination of the statutes
and the case law, and a discussion of how the rules which may be
derived from them apply to varying fact situations. The fact that the
cases and statutes need not be committed to memory does not mean
that the process of using them and considering them is not an absolutely essential part of the lawyer's education.
If law school graduates at the time of their entrance to the bar
possessed these analytical skills in full measure, it might well be asked
why a lawyer of twenty years' experience is better paid and has a
higher reputation at the bar than one whose skills are thus freshly acquired. There are several obvious answers, and perhaps the shortest
one is that the older, experienced lawyer tends to have the clients who
can afford to pay his bills. But an equally obvious answer, and probably a more satisfactory one, is that lawyers undergo a seasoning
process just as do the practitioners of any other art.
Part of this seasoning may consist in the learning of a great deal
about a particular substantive area of the law. They say that you will
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never know more law than at the time you graduate from law school,
and, speaking in terms of the whole field of legal knowledge, I would
guess that this is probably true. But those who specialize in a particular branch of the law do develop a thorough knowledge of a field
which simply can't be imparted in one or two courses in law school.
Those who specialize in courtroom practice develop a feel for procedure in evidence which is both broader and deeper than can be acquired from simply taking standard courses in those subjects.
But more fundamentally, if the lawyer continues to practice he
develops a fund of experience which, while perhaps dulling his analytical skills, improves his judgmental ability. Experience teaches him
that even when the black letter law seems to be all on the side of
one's client, the client may nonetheless not prevail if his position is
morally reprehensible. And it teaches him the converse: That if his
client has a tremendously appealing case from a common sense point
of view, even the fact that the decided cases are against him does not
necessarily doom the cause to failure. It is a sense of the importance
of facts, in the practice of law as well as in legal education, that
seems to me to be an indispensable condition for success.
I remember a remarkably able oral advocate once saying that he
didn't much care what side of a case he was arguing, because he
thought a first rate lawyer should be able to win by his persuasive ability even though the facts were against him. I was tremendously impressed with the self-confidence of the man at the time, but have since
come to feel that the remark evidences a considerably less than perfect understanding of the law or of the legal profession. If we deal
again in maxims, one that I picked up in the first year of law school,
the truth of which has become more apparent to me in each succeeding year of experience in the profession, is that "hard cases make bad
law." It is true in a criminal case and in a civil case; it is true in the
court of the magistrate and the justice of the peace, and it is also true
in the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is the ability to judge the importance of the facts, and their
moral and social implications, which is a significant part of the ability
of every mature practitioner of our profession. And if facts are that
important, certainly no law student should leave law school without the
conviction that the first duty of the lawyer upon accepting a case is
not to rush to the appellate decisions to see what the law is, but to
rigorously question his client to find out what the facts are.
This insistence on knowing the facts, and an understanding of
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how variations of factual situations may change the rule of law which
is applicable, are two of the most fundamental ingredients of a lawyer's
training. They should make him inquisitive and thoughtful, as well
as contentious. They seem to me to be the essence of what may be
called an analytical mind.
Just as there is a silver lining to every cloud, there is presumably
a cloud for every silver lining, and respected thinkers have ventured
the observation that a legal education is not an unmixed blessing. One
criticism has been that while the traditional legal education sharpens
the mind, it also narrows it.
There is undoubtedly some merit to this criticism. The judgment
of British historians is that lawyers have not tended to shine as members of Parliament, and perhaps it is for that reason. One of England's
greatest parliamentarians, Benjamin Disraeli, himself Prime Minister
in the nineteenth century, made his rather disparaging comment
about the profession after he had sat next to a lawyer at a state dinner:
He was a true lawyer, ever illustrating the obvious, explaining the evident, and expatiating the commonplace.
Another criticism that has been leveled at the profession, and not
without reason, is that it is innately conservative to a fault. I suppose
no practitioners of any art or profession who deal with a body of
knowledge, and particularly a body of knowledge consisting primarily
of rules and regulations, can avoid developing a vested interest in the
continuity of that body of knowledge.
Perhaps because of the stress on analysis, and of breaking problems and issues down into their component parts, and because of this
innate conservatism, lawyers tend to make better administrators than
they do devisers of innovative programs. If this is so, it is surely not
because they lack mental keenness, but because they tend to be limited by ingrained habits of thought. Thus to the extent that it were
possible to alter the components of legal education to place more stress
on other approaches to problems, whether it be by changes in the offerings of the law faculty itself or by the expansion of the concept
of interdisciplinary programs, legal education would undoubtedly be
the better for it. But, from the point of view of the consumer of legal
services, let me urge you, as the saying goes, not to throw the baby
out with the bath water.
It seems to me far better to run the risk of narrowing the mind
while assuredly sharpening it, than to give up all pretense of sharpening the mind for fear of narrowing it. It is this inculcation of analytical
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skills which is and ought to be an essential element of the legal education of every law student.
Speaking as one who hires three law graduates every year, from
an employer's point of view it is virtually impossible to even guess at
the level of legal skills possessed by an applicant for a job without
some indication of how he fared in competition with his fellow students-and this indication is, so far as I can tell, usually in the form
of grades. I am not suggesting the necessity or even desirability of
any particular method of grading, but surely from the point of view
of an employer there ought to be some way of knowing how a graduate
stacked up against his peers during his time in law school.
Lest grades be thought to be an undue hardship on the students,
or an arbitrary consignment of some to permanent second class citizenship, let me recall for you yet another maxim of my law school days,
to the effect that the A students make the professors, the B students
make the judges, and the C students make the money. A friend of
mine who was in considerable scholastic difficulty in law school formulated his own corollary to this maxim, to the effect that the D students
dropped out of law school, went into business, and hired the lawyers
who made the money. This may or may not be true, and the maxim
itself may or may not be true when rigorously applied, but like so
many other such sayings it has a certain validity.
Lawyers deal with a body of knowledge which is subject to exposition in numerous case books and textbooks, which is the subject
of endless commentary, which is capable of being assimilated and
spewed forth by law students. The cultivation of an understanding
of how to use this body of knowledge should be one of the great tasks
of the law school, and in the process of learning how to use it the law
student develops the skills which are necessary to a successful practice
of the profession.
But this is only a two dimensional view of the profession. In the
practice, the lawyer will be graded not by those who teach law, but
by the judges and juries before whom he appears for his client, and
by the client himself. At least a modest degree of proficiency in the
lawyer's art is a necessary condition to success in the profession, but
beyond this countless variables come into play which may elevate the
professional standing of one lawyer whose strictly professional skills
are modest over the standing of another lawyer whose strictly professional skills may be considerable.
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This fact, and I believe it to be a fact, makes our profession one
of which it may truly be said that it is a career opened to the talents.
And the talents to which it is open are so broad, and so varied, that
the mediocre student in law school is not doomed to eternally dwell
in the shadow of the honors graduate. By dint of diligence, resourcefulness, and any number of other attributes, on any given day he may
win a battle for his client against an opponent whose academic credentials are better. But surely one of the most important of these
other attributes is a competitive instinct, and a willingness to dig in
and work and fight for a particular cause. And to the extent that a
law school may inculcate this virtue, it would seem to me that it can
best be done by making law students compete, and to dig in and work,
while they are in law school.
Thus it is my hope for the University of Tulsa College of Law,
magnificently housed as it is in John Rogers Hall for its second half
century of existence, that it remains true to the great tradition of our
profession. May it never shrink from novel approaches to the education of a lawyer which may lessen the narrowing effect of traditional
legal education, or offer additional perspectives and insights which that
education has not offered in the past. May it likewise realize that
at least up until now the essence of the lawyer's art has been the application of analytical skills which are sharpened and developed through
a process of legal education depending to a large extent on the competitive testing of one's ideas and hypotheses against those of others
in oral discussion and written exposition. Long may it prosper.
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